A competitive benchmark built forward always ends the same way. Someone lists every criterion anyone can think of, twenty rows accumulate, each competitor gets scored, and the result is a table where every serious supplier lands between three and four out of five. Nothing separates. The grid gets presented, admired and never used again.

The reason is not laziness. It is that the criteria were chosen before anyone knew what the benchmark was for, and criteria chosen that way are mostly criteria on which everybody is adequate.

Build it backwards instead: start from the decisions you owe in the next two quarters, derive the criteria that would change those decisions, and fill in only those. Everything below explains why that ordering matters more than it sounds, and what public data can carry the parts you cannot guess.

The grid partly decides the answer

Two findings from preference measurement apply directly to a comparison table, and both are uncomfortable.

Adding rows changes who wins. Experimental work on attribute importance established a number-of-levels effect: holding the actual range of variation constant, increasing the number of levels on which an attribute is expressed increases its measured importance. Split “support” into four rows and support becomes more important than it was when it occupied one, without anything about the suppliers having changed.

A benchmark is exactly this operation performed casually. Every time you decompose one criterion into three, you increase its weight in the reader’s judgment. The person who builds the grid is making a strategic argument, whether or not they intend to.

And comparison itself changes the values. In the founding experiment on this, participants valued two used dictionaries, one with 10,000 entries in like-new condition and one with 20,000 entries and a torn cover. Seen side by side: $19 and $27. Seen one at a time: $24 and $20. The preference reverses, because the entry count means nothing alone and the torn cover means something to everyone.

The follow-up matters more for benchmarking. When the researchers simply supplied a reference range, telling participants what a good and a bad value looked like on the uninterpretable attribute, the reversal disappeared entirely.

That is the whole design principle for a benchmark that works. Its job is not to score. Its job is to supply the reference range on the criteria a reader cannot otherwise interpret. If you write “response time: 4 hours” the reader learns nothing. If you write “response time: 4 hours, against a category range of 1 hour to 3 business days”, you have made a criterion decidable.

How the construction of a comparison grid changes the conclusion it producesHow the construction of a comparison grid changes the conclusion it produces, from two lines of experimental evidence. The first is the number of levels effect established in work on attribute importance, which shows that holding the actual range of variation constant, increasing the number of levels on which an attribute is expressed increases its measured importance. Applied to a competitive benchmark, this means that splitting a single criterion such as support into four separate rows increases the weight that criterion carries in the reader’s judgment, without anything about the suppliers having changed, so the person who constructs the grid is making a strategic argument whether or not they intend to. The second is the evaluability effect demonstrated in a nineteen ninety six experiment in which one hundred and sixteen randomly assigned participants valued two used music dictionaries, one containing ten thousand entries in like new condition and one containing twenty thousand entries with a torn cover. Seen side by side the participants offered nineteen dollars for the first and twenty seven dollars for the second, while seen one at a time they offered twenty four dollars and twenty dollars respectively, reversing the preference, because the entry count carries no meaning in isolation whereas a torn cover is interpretable by everyone. In a follow up study the researchers supplied a reference range telling participants what a good and a bad value looked like on the previously uninterpretable attribute, and the reversal disappeared entirely. The design principle for a benchmark follows directly: its function is not to score suppliers but to supply the reference range on criteria a reader cannot otherwise interpret, so that stating a response time of four hours teaches nothing while stating four hours against a category range of one hour to three business days makes the criterion decidable.Two ways the grid writes the conclusionSplitting a criterion raises its weightHolding the real range constant, adding levels to an attribute increases its measured importance.Four rows on support beat one row on support, with identical suppliers.Comparison changes the values, and a reference range fixes itTwo options seen together$19$27the second winsThe same two, seen alone$24$20the first winsSupply the range on the uninterpretable attribute, and the reversal disappears.A benchmark’s job is not to score. It is to make a criterion decidable.
Splitting one criterion into four raises its weight. And supplying a reference range removes the instability entirely. Source : Wittink, Krishnamurthi and Reibstein, Marketing Letters 1(2), 1990; Hsee, Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 67(3), 1996, Studies 1 and 4 (1996)

A feature grid measures the wrong thing

There is a second, older objection to the standard benchmark, and it is about what is being compared at all.

The founding statement on competitive strategy draws a hard line between operational effectiveness, which is performing similar activities better than rivals, and strategic positioning, which is performing different activities or performing them differently. A twenty-row feature comparison is entirely a measure of the first. It tells you who is better at the same things.

And the article is explicit that the first is not durable on its own:

“the absence of trade-offs is a dangerous half-truth that managers must unlearn. Quality is not always free.”

The rows that would tell you something are the ones nobody puts in a benchmark: what has this competitor given up. Which segment do they not serve. Which channel have they abandoned. Which desirable attribute have they sacrificed to be good at another one.

Those are findable. A competitor with no self-service tier has given up the small end. One with a fourteen-day onboarding has given up the buyer in a hurry. One who publishes prices has given up the ability to discriminate, and one who does not has given up the buyer who wants to decide alone.

A benchmark of abandonments has one useful property that a feature grid never has: it shows you where the space is empty.

Comparison between a conventional feature benchmark and a benchmark of what each competitor has given upComparison between a conventional feature benchmark and a benchmark built from what each competitor has given up. The founding statement on competitive strategy, published in nineteen ninety six, draws a hard line between operational effectiveness, defined as performing similar activities better than rivals, and strategic positioning, defined as performing different activities or performing similar activities in different ways. A conventional twenty row feature comparison measures only the first, telling the reader who is better at the same things, and the source article is explicit that operational effectiveness alone is not durable, warning that the absence of trade offs is a dangerous half truth that managers must unlearn and that quality is not always free. The rows that would carry strategic information are the ones that never appear in a benchmark, namely what each competitor has abandoned: which segment they do not serve, which channel they have given up, and which desirable attribute they have sacrificed in order to be good at another. These are discoverable from public evidence. A competitor with no self service tier has given up the small end of the market. A competitor requiring fourteen days of onboarding has given up the buyer in a hurry. A competitor who publishes prices has given up the ability to price discriminate, and one who does not publish prices has given up the buyer who wants to decide without contacting sales. A benchmark of abandonments has one property a feature grid never has, which is that it reveals where the competitive space is empty rather than merely ranking suppliers on dimensions where all of them are adequate.Two benchmarks, two different questionsThe feature gridDoes it have X? Does it have Y?Score out of five, twenty rows.Measures operational effectiveness:who is better at the same things.Everyone lands between 3 and 4.The abandonment gridWhich segment do they not serve?Which channel have they given up?Which attribute did they sacrifice?Observable from public evidence:pricing pages, onboarding, tiers.Shows where the space is empty.
The first measures who is better at the same things. The second shows you where the space is empty. Source : Porter, What Is Strategy?, Harvard Business Review, November-December 1996, pp. 61-69 (1996)

Differentiation is lower than everyone assumes, and it does not stop anyone buying

One finding should temper the whole exercise before you build it.

Research covering 17 categories across two countries found a very low level of perceived differentiation between competing brands, and that customers went on buying them anyway. Brands that were not perceived as different succeeded just as well as those that were.

That is worth sitting with. It does not mean positioning is pointless. It means the market is not waiting to be told how different you are, and a benchmark whose purpose is to prove differentiation is answering a question buyers are not asking.

The version that survives this finding is a benchmark aimed at a decision, not at a claim: given what these suppliers actually do and do not do, what should we stop doing, start doing, or price differently. Those decisions land on the positioning, the site and the campaigns at once, which is why they stall unless the three are held together rather than split between suppliers.

There is a second reason a differentiation-proving benchmark disappoints, and it is arithmetic rather than psychology. Most criteria anyone can name are ones on which every viable supplier already clears the bar. Support exists. Security exists. Onboarding exists. A criterion where all five competitors are adequate contributes nothing to a decision but a great deal to the length of the table, and, through the number-of-levels effect above, quietly adds weight to whichever theme happens to have been decomposed into the most rows.

A quick test before a row goes in: could this criterion, on its own, make you choose a different supplier? If not, it is context, not comparison. Move it to a footnote or drop it.

Why most criteria in a competitive benchmark cannot change a decisionWhy most criteria included in a competitive benchmark cannot change a decision. Research covering seventeen categories across two countries found a very low level of perceived differentiation between competing brands, and found that customers continued to buy those brands regardless, with brands not perceived as different succeeding just as well as those that were. The implication is not that positioning is pointless but that the market is not waiting to be told how different a supplier is, so a benchmark whose purpose is to prove differentiation is answering a question buyers are not asking. A second reason such benchmarks disappoint is arithmetic rather than psychological. Most criteria that anyone can name are criteria on which every viable supplier already clears the bar, since support exists, security exists and onboarding exists at all serious suppliers. A criterion on which all five competitors are adequate contributes nothing to a decision while contributing a great deal to the length of the table, and through the number of levels effect it quietly adds weight to whichever theme happens to have been decomposed into the largest number of rows. The practical test before including a row is whether that criterion, on its own, could make the company choose a different supplier. If it could not, it is context rather than comparison, and belongs in a footnote or nowhere. The version of the exercise that survives this critique is a benchmark aimed at a decision rather than at a claim, asking what the company should stop doing, start doing, or price differently given what these suppliers actually do and do not do.The rows that cannot change anythingWhat the research found across 17 categories in two countriesVery low perceived differentiation between competing brands, and customers bought them anyway.Brands not perceived as different succeeded just as well.Rows where everyone is adequateSupport exists. Security exists.Onboarding exists.Length, not information.The test before a row goes inCould this criterion alone make youchoose a different supplier?If not, it is context. Drop it.Every adequate-for-everyone row also shifts the weighting, through the effect described above.
A criterion where everyone is adequate lengthens the table and shifts its weighting. It cannot change a decision. Source : Romaniuk, Sharp and Ehrenberg, Evidence concerning the importance of perceived brand differentiation, Australasian Marketing Journal 15(2), 2007 (2007)

What public data will and will not give you

For a company in the United States, a surprising amount of the structural work is free and official.

How many competitors exist, and where. The Census Bureau’s Statistics of U.S. Businesses reports firm counts, establishment counts, employment and payroll by industry code, employment size band, state and county. For reference year 2022 it records 6,395,635 employer firms nationally, of which 103,741 employ between 100 and 999 people. County Business Patterns provides the same picture by establishment rather than by firm, which is what you want if you sell to a site rather than to a head office.

How stable the field is. The Bureau of Labor Statistics publishes establishment survival by opening year. Across cohorts opening in 2010, 2015 and 2020, the pattern barely moves: about 80 percent survive one year, about half survive five, and a little under 40 percent survive nine. If your benchmark lists nine competitors, that history says roughly four of them will not be there in five years, and it says nothing about which four.

What none of it gives you. Public data will not name your competitors, will not tell you their pricing, and will not explain why they win. Financial filings, where they exist, show size, growth and solvency. They do not show which objection a competitor answers better than you, which segment they have quietly stopped chasing, or what their buyers actually compared them against in the meeting.

That last item is only obtainable one way, and it is the one most benchmarks skip: asking the buyers who chose someone else what was in front of them at the time.

What free public United States data provides for competitive analysis and what it does notWhat free public United States data provides for competitive analysis and what it does not. On counting competitors, the Census Bureau Statistics of U.S. Businesses reports firm counts, establishment counts, employment and payroll by industry code, employment size band, state and county, and for reference year two thousand twenty two records six million three hundred and ninety five thousand six hundred and thirty five employer firms nationally, of which one hundred and three thousand seven hundred and forty one employ between one hundred and nine hundred and ninety nine people. The separate County Business Patterns program provides the same picture by establishment rather than by firm, which is the appropriate file for a company selling to a site rather than to a head office. On the stability of a competitive field, the Bureau of Labor Statistics publishes survival rates for private sector establishments by opening year, and the pattern is remarkably consistent across cohorts opening in two thousand ten, two thousand fifteen and two thousand twenty: approximately eighty percent survive one year, approximately half survive five years, and a little under forty percent survive nine years. Applied to a benchmark listing nine competitors, that history implies roughly four of them will not exist in five years, while saying nothing about which four. What public data does not provide is equally important: it will not name specific competitors, will not disclose their pricing, and will not explain why they win deals. Financial filings, where they exist, show size, growth and solvency but do not show which objection a competitor answers better, which segment they have quietly stopped pursuing, or what their buyers actually compared them against in the decision meeting. That last item is obtainable only by asking buyers who chose another supplier what was in front of them at the time.Free, official, and limitedHow many, and where6,395,635 employer firms nationally. 103,741 of them employ 100 to 999 people.By industry code, size band, state and county. Firms in one file, establishments in another.How many will still be hereSurviving one yearabout 80%Surviving five yearsabout 50%What is in none of these filesWho your competitors are by name. Their pricing. Which objection they answer better.Which segment they abandoned. What their buyers compared them against.
Counts, geography and survival are official and free. Motive is not in any of these files. Source : U.S. Census Bureau, Statistics of U.S. Businesses 2022 and County Business Patterns; Bureau of Labor Statistics, Business Employment Dynamics, survival of private sector establishments by opening year (2025)

Filling it backwards, in order

Write the decisions first. Three to five, in one line each, that you owe an answer to in the next two quarters. Should we build a self-service tier. Should we publish prices. Should we drop the smallest segment. Should we shorten onboarding. A decision you are not actually facing does not deserve a row.

Derive the criteria from the decisions. For each decision, name the one or two facts about competitors that would change your answer. If no fact about a competitor would change it, the decision is not a competitive question and the benchmark cannot help.

Cap the grid. The method that measures how people trade off attributes recommends six or fewer, on the stated grounds that beyond that respondents resort to simplifying tactics that distort their preferences. Your readers are not more robust than experimental subjects. A benchmark with twenty rows is not more thorough, it is unreadable, and the person who built it has already decided the answer through the choice of rows.

Put a range on every criterion. Not a score, a range. Best observed, worst observed, and where each supplier sits. That is what makes an uninterpretable attribute decidable, and it is the single change that most improves a grid.

Add the abandonment column. For each competitor, one line: what they have visibly given up. It is often the most useful cell in the table, because it is where a decision for your own company becomes visible.

Record who compiled it and when. A benchmark is a snapshot of public evidence on a date, assembled by a person with a point of view. Both facts belong on the page, because the next reader will otherwise treat the grid as a measurement.

And check it against buyers, not against websites. Marketing pages tell you what a competitor claims. Buyers who chose them tell you what was actually in the room, which is the only version that determined an outcome.

The recommended order of construction for a competitive benchmarkThe recommended order of construction for a competitive benchmark, running from decisions to criteria to rows rather than the reverse. The first step is to write down three to five decisions, in one line each, that the company owes an answer to within the next two quarters, such as whether to build a self service tier, whether to publish prices, whether to drop the smallest segment, or whether to shorten onboarding, on the principle that a decision the company is not actually facing does not deserve a row. The second step is to derive the criteria from those decisions by naming, for each decision, the one or two facts about competitors that would change the answer, and if no fact about a competitor would change it then the decision is not a competitive question and a benchmark cannot help. The third step is to cap the grid at six criteria or fewer, following the published recommendation of the reference method for measuring trade offs, which warns that beyond that point respondents suffer severe information overload and resort to simplifying tactics that distort their true preference structures, so a twenty row benchmark is not more thorough but unreadable, and the person who built it has already determined the answer through the choice of rows. The fourth step is to put a range rather than a score on every criterion, giving the best observed value, the worst observed value and where each supplier sits, which is what converts an uninterpretable attribute into a decidable one. The fifth step is to add an abandonment column stating, in one line per competitor, what that competitor has visibly given up. The sixth step is to record who compiled the grid and on what date, because a benchmark is a snapshot of public evidence assembled by a person with a point of view rather than a measurement. The seventh step is to check the grid against buyers who chose another supplier rather than against competitors’ marketing pages.Decisions, then criteria, then rows1. DecisionsThree to five you owewithin two quarters2. CriteriaThe facts that wouldchange each answer3. RowsSix at most, each witha range, not a scoreThen three things most grids omitAn abandonment line per competitor: what they have visibly given up.Who compiled it, and on what date.A check against buyers who chose someone else, not against marketing pages.If no fact about a competitor would change a decision, that decision does not belong in the grid.
Decisions produce criteria. Criteria produce rows. Not the other way around, and never more than six. Source : Green and Srinivasan, Journal of Marketing 54(4), 1990, p. 11; Hsee, OBHDP 67(3), 1996; Porter, Harvard Business Review, 1996 (1996)

A benchmark built this way is shorter, less impressive in a deck, and considerably harder to ignore. It ends in a decision rather than in a table, which is the only test worth applying: if the grid could have come out either way and nothing would have changed, it was never a benchmark. It was a summary.